

## **the economics of corruption: Mpumalanga Province as case study.**

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defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff: 2004) has become the public scourge for a large number of South Africa the Province of Mpumalanga has drawn much public attention about its perceived level of corruption hence the case study

will explore the theoretical aspects of corruption using the principal-agent model. Whereas some economists have argued that where public institutions operate at sub-optimal level of efficiency because it cuts through bad bureaucracy and thereby facilitates an institutional economics framework, will argue for the opposite view, namely that corruption leads to welfare loss to society will be used to examine Mpumalanga as case study

what theory sheds about corruption will be examined in the second section of the paper.

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like crime is judged as more serious than such action in the private sector because it seems to affect and undermine the basis of

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use of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff, 2004), subverts the notion that private vices are public benefits as proposed in the famous book *The Fables of the Bees*. The latter proposition argued that self interest is beneficial to society if channeled through public office. Corruption on the other hand is the misuse of public office for private benefit and it includes bribery and extortion and can only take place between two parties namely the corruptor and the corruptee. Corruption, can only be committed by individuals and not by inanimate entities.

It is argued that corruption leads to a situation of less than efficient economic outcomes and can be seen as tax to the poor, many of whom are in the province of Mpumalanga in South Africa will be used as case study, not because it is more corrupt than the other eight provinces but more as the most corrupt province in South Africa.

The view that corruption is the “grease that oils the squeaky wheels of bad bureaucracy”. In this argument corruption cuts down the transaction costs of doing business and by so doing increase efficiency and hence by implication increase economic growth and welfare. In countries where institutions are weak, corruption becomes the most efficient way of facilitating transactions between parties.

From a neoclassical economics framework, will argue for the opposite view, namely that corruption leads to welfare loss to society.

North (1990:3), drawing on the works of Douglas North defines institutions (legal, political, social and economic) as the formal and informal constraints that shape human interaction. At intermediate level formal institutions include the degree of property rights protection and enforcement, the fair application of laws. The informal institutions would include, norms, values, customs and culture. Schmid (2005:1) views institutions as human

constraints and enablement. This would mean that a constraint on one person becomes an opportunity for another. Institutions create and provide signals to act in a particular way or as incentive to participate in the economy. Transactions are the building blocks of the economy.

Quality of institutions are the quality of governance (extent of corruption, political rights, public sector efficiency and regulatory burden) and constraints placed on political leaders. These measures are by definition not objective but subjective perceptions which are measured by such as Transparency International, Afro-barometer and other Non Governmental Organisations.

Quality of institutions are, namely the aggregate governance which is based on the works by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton(1999) measures (a) civil liberties, political rights and an independent media (b) political stability and absence of violence, meaning that governments are elected by the electorate (c) government effectiveness, that the quality of services provided by the public sector and a non dirigiste state, that is to say, relative absence of government controls on goods and services markets (banking and interest rates) (d) security of persons and property against theft and violence, an independent and effective judiciary system (f) freedom from graft, that is freedom from private gain.

The measurement of the quality of institutions is the way property rights are protected and enforced. The last part is concerned with limiting and constraining the president and other political leaders and elites from abusing power.

### **a historical perspective:**

South Africa came with the colonisation of South Africa in 1652. On one hand Colonial institutions were extractive institutions leading to the exclusion of non-European population (Acemoglu, 2003). On the other hand, the positive side of colonization was to bring in modern representative assemblies, Scottish and English banking, Common law, a limited state with the separation of powers, Protestantism and the foundation for a thriving capitalist system, team sports (Ferguson, 2003) and of course the English Language which has become useful. In addition to the formal institutions there was a dual set of moral ethics, one for the indigenous inhabitants and one for the new expatriates, but he argued that colonialism exuded relative morality towards its citizenry which was later to be perfected by the Apartheid state.

modern day South Africa one has to compare pre- and post-1994 South Africa (Sole, 2005). Comparing and contrasting a constitutionally defined democracy with the pre-1994 Apartheid state is itself problematic. The pre-1994 state was built on racial hierarchy with the whites at the top enjoying the benefits of a formal democracy and then the rest of the population received leftovers which cascaded downwards according to skin hue and social status. Informal institutions were designed to entrench white privilege and patronage. Sole (2005) points out that the apartheid state was riddled with corruption. This is not to downplay the fact that corruption in post Apartheid South Africa may be beginning to take a life of its own in the new democratic times.

Informal institutions (Sole: 2005) to give voice to the people other than white, in the pre-1994 South Africa dispensation (apartheid) were found strongly within those communities. These informal networks (Ansell, 2004) became embedded in the social fabric of society through organizations, street committees, self-defense units, sports clubs, schools, universities and so on. In these communities formal (state) institutions were illegitimate, impersonal and morally bankrupt. Capitalism became synonymous with racial oppression, stealing from whites to give to blacks a "redistribution" of wealth from the rich to the poor. A kind of Robin Hood syndrome developed within the largely black communities as respect for traditional relationships developed within these groupings, of sharing and comradeship against the formal master-servant inter-relationships.

As Ansell (2007), argues that societies with strong interpersonal relations may have little notion of the formal agency-principal relations and the state (agent) may have a superior obligation to the state (as principal) and society (as client) may seem unnatural and impersonal to them. Comradeship or comradeship is paramount to such communities. In such communities it becomes difficult to establish modern bureaucratic structures based on skills and performance. The separation of roles of the state (as employer) and employees as agents of the state is superseded by personal ties or comrades of clients. Clients or citizens expect that their personal ties with their comrade-official would facilitate transactions for government services or some other special favours to get things done, citizen-comrades think it appropriate to reward such officials.

Informal institutions are more helpful during the times of oppression and illiberal democracy. In the post-1994 democracy these informal institutions were many of whom were also involved in the freedom struggle. Again Rose Ackerman (1999:107) informs us that in the post Soviet states the members of the underground carried their loyalties and connections over to the new post-Soviet state. Similarly, post 1994 South Africa the struggle against the Apartheid state have been carried over to the new government. Many in the echelons of power cannot distinguish between the state and the informal networks of the ruling party. The state has come to be perceived as family business by those who benefit from it.

background that we must view the perceptions about Mpumalanga. To understand Mpumalanga we must understand the institutions

### **Corruption : principal-agent relationship**

perceived by the state as principal is that she does not know much about the bureaucrat as agent. Much time is spent on searching for opportunistic behaviour, formal or informal. This brings in the problem of markets with asymmetric information (Pindyck & Rubinfeld) and mean that one of the contracting partners (agent) is a hypocrite who distorts information by lying, obfuscation or by using any means and knows that he is a lemon. This would lead to the problem of adverse selection where once the agent has been employed he is not sackable. Depending on the nature of the contract signed, it would be difficult to sack such an agent, especially by proving it to third parties.

Asymmetric information is that once the employee has gained employment the less responsible he behaves given that he does not have to bear the costs and the less the incentive to behave responsibly as he would if he had to bear the costs himself (Barr, 1990). This is the problem of moral hazard and kickbacks and bribery becomes an incentive to perform his duties by such a bureaucrat.

### **Corruption: client-agent relationship, a stage game approach**

of Pechlivanos (2005), which has been useful in understanding corruption, using game theory. If contracts between principal-agent are prohibited, then the client must rely on the agent for such corrupt transactions. It is further assumed that the principal has no means to control his agents as means to deter corruption. It is further assumed that the principal is aware of the self-enforcing nature of the contract and therefore manipulate information so as to mangle the information that reaches the client as way of discouraging corruption. In a stage game approach, the contract is enforced by the client. If trust is broken between client and agent then opportunities for corruption are diminished.

Two players, the client and the agent.



$S_A = 0$

<b>Deliver (d)</b>	<b>Not Deliver (nd)</b>
<b>B-C, B-C</b>	<b>-C, B</b>
<b>B, -C</b>	<b>0, 0</b>

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$S_A = 1$

<b>Deliver (d)</b>	<b>Not Deliver (nd)</b>
<b>-C, B-C</b>	<b>-C, B</b>
<b>0, -C</b>	<b>0, 0</b>

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ed if the client does not trust the agent. Both become better off if the client does not bribe and the agent does not deliver.

complex if the principal introduces some punishment. Assuming there are three types of agents, namely those who are easily d  
ts ( $N_n$ ) and agents who tough to deter ( $N_t$ ). The client now faces uncertainty whether the agent is one who is deterred or not d

that the agent is non deterred. If harsh punishments are meted out by the principal then  $\mu_0^{harsh} = N_t$ , while when moderate punishment is used  $\mu_0^{moderate} < N_t$ . The non deterred do not want to be seen as weaklings who mimic the easily deterred. They want to build a reputation of being tough. The only constraint they face is one of being audited by the principal. ND agents engage in the strategy of survival against the principal through active resistance and develop counter strategies to frustrate the principal. They may be l

### **Corruption: client-agent relationship and the usage of intermediaries.**

Accompanying the previous transaction it is more innocuous for clients to seek intermediaries who will transact on their behalf. These intermediaries can be lawyers, accountants, commercial agents, joint venture companies or even local subsidiaries. The services of intermediaries are normally legitimate. Their value for their knowledge of local institutions be they formal or informal, ranging from legislation to norms, value systems, language and customs. The primary motivation for the use of intermediaries in corrupt deals is to reduce transaction costs and reduce risk

It is common for these intermediaries to pay bribes on behalf of their client. This method is particularly practiced in contracts that involve high stakes and where many parties are involved. In certain instances violent (as with the Mafia in Italy) acts may be committed to secure such contracts. The benefit of using intermediaries is that it can exercise the option of deniability in the cases of uncontrolled risks. Loss of control over the transaction can result in litigation and the intermediary pays a bribe on behalf of the company a claim can be made by such a company that such a middle man acted on his own

### **Impact of corruption ?**

As mentioned, it is clear that corruption raises transaction costs and uncertainty in the economy. Bribery leads to the most inefficient market outcomes. While it may increase the efficiency of the market for their efficiency but for the size of the bribe; corruption is some form of regressive tax on the poor as money which would have gone to the poor is shared among the corrupt; corruption also undermines the legitimacy of the state.

05) point out that corruption is self-fulfilling in nature. This becomes some form of adaptive expectations, as it induces a number of individuals to engage in corrupt transactions in order not to be excluded from anticipated benefits of corrupt transactions, the cost of which are lowered as corruption becomes more widespread.

As documented in Gray and Kauffman (1998). Perhaps the costs of corruption can best be illustrated by the case study done by Alesina and Wacziarg (2005) informs us that Nigeria has become something of a pariah state. Nigerians are perceived as corrupt. They get “special treatment” for visas, bank loans or when they transact outside their own country. Nigerians suffer stereotyping of the worst form. An inference is drawn that corruption in Nigeria is systemic and that weak institutions have led to poor perceptions about Nigeria and its people. The cost of corruption is high and it is difficult to quantify both qualitatively and quantitatively.

## **Mpumalanga**

The perception of respondents towards corruption according to the survey done in the nine provinces of South Africa and it is taken into account. These surveys inform us that whereas popular mass media informs us that the Province of Mpumalanga is the most corrupt, the survey results do not confirm this. As argued before that corruption is actually difficult to prove third parties. There could be a number of reasons why this is the case. Corrupt transactions, della Porta and Vanucci (2005), inform us that there are learning effects in corrupt transactions. This is to say that individuals concerned with the most effective methods for creating, managing and enforcing corrupt relations are acquired and accumulated over time. The “rules” of corruption become the an invisible guide (or is it invisible hand of corruption ?) to behaviour. Corrupt transactions are often seen as a “sure thing” (insurance premium), which reduces the risk and uncertainty of being caught to the minimum. Interestingly, these authors also point out that corruption and non-corruption depends upon not only individual preferences and institutional context but also strategic interactions with others (in the provinces in this case), such corrupt individuals invest more in acquiring “illegality skills” and by so doing perfecting the art of corruption.

As a country that enjoys civil liberties, it seems reasonable that there is some sizeable amount of corruption in Mpumalanga. However, we have to be cautious until some further studies are done. Mpumalanga is a diverse geographical area and one would be careful not to oversimplify issues.

With respect to the quality of institutions and economic performance (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003), evidence suggests that the quality of institutions and economic performance is essential not matter the geographical complexities of a country. Good institutions make strong economic sense and they are essential for each other, thus creating a virtuous circle of economic development.

concept of corruption and showed that corruption is such a complex phenomenon. Whether corruption would succeed in subverting institutions that exist. Good institutions must enforce property rights to encourage participation in the economy; constraints on the power of those who do not expropriate resources of others; good institutions provide incentives and opportunities to the broad segments of society so that they can be investing in human capital or in productive investment. In a way good institutions can be seen as a public good.

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**Notes**

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**Q56a. Corruption: office of the Presidency \* Province Crosstabulation**

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kw
n	Count	123	61	74	79	35	91	13	37	
	% within Province	23.7%	29.5%	30.0%	49.1%	24.0%	28.4%	29.5%	13.9%	
n	Count	227	75	77	45	70	130	13	134	
	% within Province	43.8%	36.2%	31.2%	28.0%	47.9%	40.6%	29.5%	50.2%	
n	Count	101	31	56	20	16	35	3	14	
	% within Province	19.5%	15.0%	22.7%	12.4%	11.0%	10.9%	6.8%	5.2%	
haven't	Count	28	9	11	1	8	16	3	4	
	% within Province	5.4%	4.3%	4.5%	.6%	5.5%	5.0%	6.8%	1.5%	
n	Count	39	31	29	16	17	48	12	78	
	% within Province	7.5%	15.0%	11.7%	9.9%	11.6%	15.0%	27.3%	29.2%	
Province	Count	518	207	247	161	146	320	44	267	
	% within Province	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q56b. Corruption: Members of Parliament \* Province Crosstabulation**

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kw
n	Count	79	41	67	73	23	53	12	12	
	% within Province	15.2%	19.9%	27.0%	45.3%	15.6%	16.6%	27.3%	4.5%	
n	Count	263	91	81	53	71	170	17	155	
	% within Province	50.7%	44.2%	32.7%	32.9%	48.3%	53.1%	38.6%	58.1%	
n	Count	116	39	56	20	25	52	4	36	
	% within Province	22.4%	18.9%	22.6%	12.4%	17.0%	16.3%	9.1%	13.5%	
haven't	Count	32	6	19	0	5	13	1	6	
	% within Province	6.2%	2.9%	7.7%	.0%	3.4%	4.1%	2.3%	2.2%	
n	Count	29	29	25	15	23	32	10	58	
	% within Province	5.6%	14.1%	10.1%	9.3%	15.6%	10.0%	22.7%	21.7%	
Province	Count	519	206	248	161	147	320	44	267	
	% within Province	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q56c. Corruption: local government councilors \* Province Crosstabulation**

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kw
n	Count	97	43	73	56	26	50	13	15	
	% within Province	18.7%	20.9%	29.4%	35.0%	17.7%	15.6%	28.9%	5.6%	
n	Count	247	83	77	62	64	173	17	150	
	% within Province	47.7%	40.3%	31.0%	38.8%	43.5%	53.9%	37.8%	56.2%	
n	Count	102	40	48	28	27	54	3	23	
	% within Province	19.7%	19.4%	19.4%	17.5%	18.4%	16.8%	6.7%	8.6%	
haven't	Count	47	14	22	2	8	13	2	6	
	% within Province	9.1%	6.8%	8.9%	1.3%	5.4%	4.0%	4.4%	2.2%	
n	Count	25	26	28	12	22	31	10	73	
	% within Province	4.8%	12.6%	11.3%	7.5%	15.0%	9.7%	22.2%	27.3%	
Province	Count	518	206	248	160	147	321	45	267	
	% within Province	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q56d. Corruption: national government officials \* Province Crosstabulation**

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kw
n	Count	87	51	70	66	25	54	14	12	
	% within Province	16.8%	24.6%	28.2%	41.3%	17.2%	16.9%	31.1%	4.5%	
n	Count	253	86	83	51	74	161	15	150	
	% within Province	48.8%	41.5%	33.5%	31.9%	51.0%	50.3%	33.3%	56.0%	
n	Count	116	35	52	23	19	44	6	23	
	% within Province	22.4%	16.9%	21.0%	14.4%	13.1%	13.8%	13.3%	8.6%	
haven't	Count	27	7	16	1	7	18	1	3	
	% within Province	5.2%	3.4%	6.5%	.6%	4.8%	5.6%	2.2%	1.1%	
n	Count	35	28	27	19	20	43	9	80	
	% within Province	6.8%	13.5%	10.9%	11.9%	13.8%	13.4%	20.0%	29.9%	
Province	Count	518	207	248	160	145	320	45	268	
	% within Province	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

nt officials \* Province Crosstabulation

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kw
n	Count	79	41	69	48	20	58	11	10	
	% within Province	15.2%	19.8%	27.9%	29.8%	13.7%	18.1%	25.0%	3.7%	
n	Count	242	86	76	57	75	162	15	152	
	% within Province	46.6%	41.5%	30.8%	35.4%	51.4%	50.6%	34.1%	56.7%	
n	Count	128	45	64	38	24	46	5	22	
	% within Province	24.7%	21.7%	25.9%	23.6%	16.4%	14.4%	11.4%	8.2%	
haven't	Count	45	11	10	5	6	22	2	3	
	% within Province	8.7%	5.3%	4.0%	3.1%	4.1%	6.9%	4.5%	1.1%	
n	Count	25	24	28	13	21	32	11	81	
	% within Province	4.8%	11.6%	11.3%	8.1%	14.4%	10.0%	25.0%	30.2%	
Province	Count	519	207	247	161	146	320	44	268	
	% within Province	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q56f. Corruption: police \* Province Crosstabulation**

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu
Count	Count	52	26	61	44	13	41	11	6	
	% within Province	10.1%	12.7%	24.7%	27.5%	8.9%	12.8%	25.0%	2.2%	
Count	Count	193	81	84	61	82	172	15	170	
	% within Province	37.3%	39.5%	34.0%	38.1%	56.2%	53.6%	34.1%	63.7%	
Count	Count	198	65	71	35	30	69	5	34	
	% within Province	38.3%	31.7%	28.7%	21.9%	20.5%	21.5%	11.4%	12.7%	
Count	Count	69	28	10	14	17	15	3	13	
	% within Province	13.3%	13.7%	4.0%	8.8%	11.6%	4.7%	6.8%	4.9%	
Count	Count	5	5	21	6	4	24	10	44	
	% within Province	1.0%	2.4%	8.5%	3.8%	2.7%	7.5%	22.7%	16.5%	
Count	Count	517	205	247	160	146	321	44	267	
	% within Province	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Province Crosstabulation

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu
Count	112	43	66	70	32	85	12	29	
% within Province	21.6%	20.8%	26.6%	43.2%	21.9%	26.6%	27.3%	10.9%	
Count	176	74	74	49	63	107	9	117	
% within Province	34.0%	35.7%	29.8%	30.2%	43.2%	33.4%	20.5%	43.8%	
Count	97	33	54	12	23	33	4	15	
% within Province	18.7%	15.9%	21.8%	7.4%	15.8%	10.3%	9.1%	5.6%	
Count	41	8	12	5	3	7	1	4	
% within Province	7.9%	3.9%	4.8%	3.1%	2.1%	2.2%	2.3%	1.5%	
Count	92	49	42	26	25	88	18	102	
% within Province	17.8%	23.7%	16.9%	16.0%	17.1%	27.5%	40.9%	38.2%	
Count	518	207	248	162	146	320	44	267	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q56h. Corruption: judges and magistrates \* Province Crosstabulation**

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu
Count	129	52	83	90	41	95	13	46	
% within Province	24.9%	25.2%	33.6%	55.9%	28.1%	29.7%	29.5%	17.2%	
Count	233	88	74	35	63	127	12	118	
% within Province	44.9%	42.7%	30.0%	21.7%	43.2%	39.7%	27.3%	44.2%	
Count	71	30	51	14	14	28	3	12	
% within Province	13.7%	14.6%	20.6%	8.7%	9.6%	8.8%	6.8%	4.5%	
Count	27	8	10	4	5	7	2	1	
% within Province	5.2%	3.9%	4.0%	2.5%	3.4%	2.2%	4.5%	.4%	
Count	59	28	29	18	23	63	14	90	
% within Province	11.4%	13.6%	11.7%	11.2%	15.8%	19.7%	31.8%	33.7%	
Count	519	206	247	161	146	320	44	267	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Province Crosstabulation

	Province									
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu	
Count	137	52	84	58	34	51	13	75		
% within Province	26.4%	25.2%	33.9%	36.0%	23.3%	15.9%	29.5%	28.1%		
Count	226	102	74	71	73	163	15	106		
% within Province	43.6%	49.5%	29.8%	44.1%	50.0%	50.8%	34.1%	39.7%		
Count	84	26	49	14	25	63	3	9		
% within Province	16.2%	12.6%	19.8%	8.7%	17.1%	19.6%	6.8%	3.4%		
Count	40	12	11	6	4	11	1	5		
% within Province	7.7%	5.8%	4.4%	3.7%	2.7%	3.4%	2.3%	1.9%		
Count	31	14	30	12	10	33	12	72		
% within Province	6.0%	6.8%	12.1%	7.5%	6.8%	10.3%	27.3%	27.0%		
Count	518	206	248	161	146	321	44	267		
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q56j. Corruption: teachers and school administrators \* Province Crosstabulation**

	Province									
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu	
Count	156	65	76	73	35	80	15	65		
% within Province	30.1%	31.6%	30.6%	45.6%	24.0%	25.0%	33.3%	24.3%		
Count	230	85	88	47	76	152	15	124		
% within Province	44.3%	41.3%	35.5%	29.4%	52.1%	47.5%	33.3%	46.3%		
Count	75	34	43	25	19	38	2	13		
% within Province	14.5%	16.5%	17.3%	15.6%	13.0%	11.9%	4.4%	4.9%		
Count	25	7	14	0	9	9	2	4		
% within Province	4.8%	3.4%	5.6%	.0%	6.2%	2.8%	4.4%	1.5%		
Count	33	15	27	15	7	41	11	62		
% within Province	6.4%	7.3%	10.9%	9.4%	4.8%	12.8%	24.4%	23.1%		
Count	519	206	248	160	146	320	45	268		
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

permit \* Province Crosstabulation

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu Natal
Count	447	196	175	152	109	293	43	258	443
% within Province	86.3%	94.7%	70.3%	95.0%	74.7%	91.6%	97.7%	96.6%	90.6%
Count	46	5	28	8	23	16	0	4	38
% within Province	8.9%	2.4%	11.2%	5.0%	15.8%	5.0%	.0%	1.5%	7.8%
Count	18	2	32	0	11	5	0	4	4
% within Province	3.5%	1.0%	12.9%	.0%	7.5%	1.6%	.0%	1.5%	.8%
Count	3	4	7	0	2	4	0	0	1
% within Province	.6%	1.9%	2.8%	.0%	1.4%	1.3%	.0%	.0%	.2%
Count	4	0	7	0	1	2	1	1	3
% within Province	.8%	.0%	2.8%	.0%	.7%	.6%	2.3%	.4%	.6%
Count	518	207	249	160	146	320	44	267	489
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q57b. Pay bribe for: school placement \* Province Crosstabulation**

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu Natal
Count	463	193	170	153	116	304	44	263	
% within Province	89.2%	93.7%	68.5%	95.6%	79.5%	94.7%	100.0%	97.8%	
Count	23	9	29	3	19	12	0	2	
% within Province	4.4%	4.4%	11.7%	1.9%	13.0%	3.7%	.0%	.7%	
Count	20	3	34	2	9	2	0	1	
% within Province	3.9%	1.5%	13.7%	1.3%	6.2%	.6%	.0%	.4%	
Count	3	1	7	0	2	1	0	0	
% within Province	.6%	.5%	2.8%	.0%	1.4%	.3%	.0%	.0%	
Count	10	0	8	2	0	2	0	3	
% within Province	1.9%	.0%	3.2%	1.3%	.0%	.6%	.0%	1.1%	
Count	519	206	248	160	146	321	44	269	
Province	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

ervice \* Province Crosstabulation

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu Natal
Count	462	193	169	152	113	305	44	259	469
% within Province	89.2%	93.2%	68.1%	94.4%	77.4%	95.0%	100.0%	96.6%	96.1%
Count	23	7	30	3	19	13	0	6	10
% within Province	4.4%	3.4%	12.1%	1.9%	13.0%	4.0%	.0%	2.2%	2.0%
Count	25	4	28	1	10	2	0	2	5
% within Province	4.8%	1.9%	11.3%	.6%	6.8%	.6%	.0%	.7%	1.0%
Count	2	3	13	3	4	1	0	0	3
% within Province	.4%	1.4%	5.2%	1.9%	2.7%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.6%
Count	6	0	8	2	0	0	0	1	1
% within Province	1.2%	.0%	3.2%	1.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.4%	.2%
Count	518	207	248	161	146	321	44	268	488
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q57d. Pay bribe for: avoid problem with tax official \* Province Crosstabulation**

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu Natal
Count	470	199	174	154	114	310	44	266	98
% within Province	90.7%	96.1%	69.9%	95.7%	78.1%	96.6%	100.0%	99.3%	98.1%
Count	24	3	32	3	16	5	0	1	1
% within Province	4.6%	1.4%	12.9%	1.9%	11.0%	1.6%	.0%	.4%	.1%
Count	17	3	18	0	7	2	0	0	0
% within Province	3.3%	1.4%	7.2%	.0%	4.8%	.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Count	2	1	15	1	3	0	0	0	0
% within Province	.4%	.5%	6.0%	.6%	2.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Count	5	1	10	3	6	4	0	1	0
% within Province	1.0%	.5%	4.0%	1.9%	4.1%	1.2%	.0%	.4%	.0%
Count	518	207	249	161	146	321	44	268	98
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Count with police \* Province Crosstabulation**

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu N
Count	450	194	164	152	109	305	44	264	
% within Province	86.9%	94.2%	66.1%	94.4%	74.1%	95.0%	100.0%	98.5%	96
Count	29	7	40	8	22	7	0	4	
% within Province	5.6%	3.4%	16.1%	5.0%	15.0%	2.2%	.0%	1.5%	2
Count	28	3	22	1	9	2	0	0	
% within Province	5.4%	1.5%	8.9%	.6%	6.1%	.6%	.0%	.0%	
Count	9	2	12	0	3	6	0	0	
% within Province	1.7%	1.0%	4.8%	.0%	2.0%	1.9%	.0%	.0%	
Count	2	0	10	0	4	1	0	0	
% within Province	.4%	.0%	4.0%	.0%	2.7%	.3%	.0%	.0%	
Count	518	206	248	161	147	321	44	268	
e	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q57f. Election incentives offered \* Province Crosstabulation**

	Province								
	Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	Kwazulu Na
Count	475	198	176	159	119	280	44	256	
% within Province	91.7%	95.7%	71.0%	98.8%	81.0%	87.2%	100.0%	95.5%	91
Count	31	4	23	2	19	16	0	10	
% within Province	6.0%	1.9%	9.3%	1.2%	12.9%	5.0%	.0%	3.7%	6
Count	6	2	28	0	6	12	0	1	
% within Province	1.2%	1.0%	11.3%	.0%	4.1%	3.7%	.0%	.4%	2
Count	6	3	14	0	3	7	0	1	
% within Province	1.2%	1.4%	5.6%	.0%	2.0%	2.2%	.0%	.4%	
Count	0	0	7	0	0	6	0	0	
% within Province	.0%	.0%	2.8%	.0%	.0%	1.9%	.0%	.0%	
Count	518	207	248	161	147	321	44	268	
e	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

ive \* Province Crosstabulation

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	KwaZulu-Natal
	Count	23	16	26	23	28	4	3	1	
	% within Province	4.4%	7.7%	10.5%	14.4%	19.3%	1.2%	6.8%	4.4%	
	Count	86	40	39	45	9	20	8	69	
	% within Province	16.6%	19.3%	15.8%	28.1%	6.2%	6.2%	18.2%	25.7%	
able	Count	407	145	173	83	104	297	32	190	
	% within Province	78.7%	70.0%	70.0%	51.9%	71.7%	92.5%	72.7%	70.9%	
	Count	1	6	9	9	4	0	1	8	
	% within Province	.2%	2.9%	3.6%	5.6%	2.8%	.0%	2.3%	3.0%	
e	Count	517	207	247	160	145	321	44	268	
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Q58b. Right or wrong: favor for service \* Province Crosstabulation**

		Province								
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape	KwaZulu-Natal
	Count	22	10	26	17	28	7	2	3	
	% within Province	4.2%	4.9%	10.5%	10.6%	19.3%	2.2%	4.5%	1.1%	
	Count	67	33	33	38	13	38	10	11	
	% within Province	12.9%	16.0%	13.3%	23.6%	9.0%	11.8%	22.7%	4.1%	
able	Count	427	158	172	96	97	275	32	247	
	% within Province	82.4%	76.7%	69.4%	59.6%	66.9%	85.7%	72.7%	92.2%	
	Count	2	5	17	10	7	1	0	7	
	% within Province	.4%	2.4%	6.9%	6.2%	4.8%	.3%	.0%	2.6%	
e	Count	518	206	248	161	145	321	44	268	
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**nt for supporters \* Province Crosstabulation**

		Province							
		Gauteng	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Western Cape
ing at all	Count	21	11	27	17	33	8	2	
	% within Province	4.1%	5.3%	10.8%	10.6%	22.4%	2.5%	4.5%	3.1%
out andable	Count	84	41	43	43	17	42	8	
	% within Province	16.2%	19.9%	17.3%	26.7%	11.6%	13.1%	18.2%	27.1%
and punishable	Count	403	151	173	91	90	270	33	
	% within Province	77.9%	73.3%	69.5%	56.5%	61.2%	84.4%	75.0%	65.2%
ow	Count	9	3	6	10	7	0	1	
	% within Province	1.7%	1.5%	2.4%	6.2%	4.8%	.0%	2.3%	3.1%
n Province	Count	517	206	249	161	147	320	44	
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%