

What underlying factors drive Zimbabwe's military expenditure and what are the domestic security insinuations?

Zachary Tambudzai

School of Economics and Finance
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Private Bag X01
Scottsville3209,
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

tambudzai@ukzn.ac.za

1

1. Introduction

- Zimbabwe's millex burden of around 3.8 (2008) is modest but has since increased significantly compared to 1.7 in 2004.
- The econometric results of previous researches on Zimbabwe and African countries do not explain fully the variation of millex allocations (Tambudzai, 2006a; Tambudzai, 2006b).
- There seems to be other underlying causes of millex allocations, which are difficult to quantify: traditional beliefs and attitudes of the decision-makers.
- Very little is known about the military budgeting.
- Millex in SSA for the period 1999 to 2008 increased in real terms (SIPRI, 2009). Millex in Africa increased by 10.2 % in real terms in 2008. Over the past decade, millex in Africa has increased by 40 % (dominated by North Africa, Algeria and South Africa)

2

Year	Military expenditures - percent of GDP
2003	3.2
2004	1.7
2005	4.3
2006	4
2007	3.8
2008	3.8

3

- What motivated the research is the assertion that the presence or expectation of war provides the main reason for millex, then why is millex not decreasing in Zimbabwe?
- Serious decline in economic performance over the past decade; triggered by escalating defence expenditures in the late 1990s.
- The DRC expedition cost Harare multilateral financial and development aid.
- The absence of balance of payments support from the IMF and the low export receipts should have dampened millex levels between 2000 and 2008.
- Why was defence expenditure not sacrificed?

4

Table A1 Zimbabwe's economic growth 2000-2008

Year	GDP - real growth rate (%)
2000	0
2001	-6.1
2002	-6.5
2003	-12.1
2004	-13.6
2005	-8.2
2006	-7.7
2007	-4.4
2008	-6

5

- This paper explores the internal political and economic dynamics that underpin the millex levels of post-colonial Zimbabwe.
- The paper attempts to reveal the concealed or underlying influences on the military budgetary process.
- The aim is to improve our understanding of the drivers of millex in Zimbabwe & Africa, in addition to the traditional determinants from econometric studies.

6

2. Conventional determinants of millex [West, 1992]

- The past
 - Geo-strategic considerations (motive)
 - Financial and economic factors (opportunity)
- Possible additional determinants of millex:
[Harris 2002a]**
- The belief that a strong military is necessary for security
 - The pursuit of national prestige and status
 - The desire to fulfill international tasks e.g. by providing peacekeeping forces
 - The influence of the military pressure group

7

3. Previous studies

- The military budgetary process studies on Africa include recent studies by Henk and Rupiya (2001), Hendrickson and Ball (2002), Omitoogun (2003), and Omitoogun and Hutchful (2006).
- These studies show that there are many off-budget sources of income and outlays are deliberately included in non-military budgets (Hendrickson and Ball, 2002; Henk and Rupiya, 2001; Omitoogun and Hutchful, 2006).
- Weapons purchases are usually funded via off budget & extra budgetary sources.
- Henk & Rupiya (2001) found that there is no prescribed military budgeting process & millex is determined by a small faction close to the executive
- Omitoogun & Hutchful (2006) concluded that the standard procedures for budgeting were not followed in practice.
- Parliamentary oversight & the work of the auditor-general has been hampered by dominant ruling parties.
- The culture of secrecy was evident in most African countries.

8

4. Research methods: Qualitative

- Research questions are the mechanisms, which the researcher used to uncover the desired information. We attempt to establish the importance of factors outlined in Harris (2002a). A number of research questions were formulated (most adopted from Harris (2004a, 2004b)).
- 1. What are the chief arguments used to justify Zimbabwe's level of military expenditure? In your opinion, how valid are they?
- 2. What do you think are the fundamental factors, which determine the level and trend of Zimbabwe's military expenditure?
- 3. To what extent do you think the military is or should be a special case, which should get most of what it wants in terms of budgetary resources?
- 4. Are you familiar with Zimbabwe's budgetary decision-making process? To what extent are 'the rules' being followed with respect to military expenditure?
- 5. Is there any sense within Cabinet of trade-offs between military expenditure and other government expenditure categories or is each a separate decision?

9

Research methods: Qualitative

- 6. To what extent do pressure groups influence Zimbabwe's military expenditure decisions? Do you have any illustrations of their actions?
- 7. To what extent do you think beliefs or attitudes held by Zimbabweans influence the country's level of military expenditure?
- 8. To what extent do you think that pressures from outside Zimbabwe influence its level of military expenditure?
- 9. How is national pride or status understood by government decision makers?
- 10. How is security understood by government decision makers?
- 11. How is budgetary allocation decisions made in both technical and political senses?
- 12. How are new understandings of the role of the military being used in order to maintain millex levels when territorial security is of limited relevance?
- 13. What are the dynamics of the military pressure group operations in Zimbabwe?

10

5. Research findings

5.1 Evidence from informal interviews

- 7 major themes emerged from the informal interviews responses.

Justification of millex allocations

- Government officials gave five factors that influence the change in millex allocations: state security, regime change threats from the West, defence salary bill, fulfilling peacekeeping duties, wars & a renewal programme.
- Other informants gave different reasons for allocations as the government's desire to curry favour with the military, regional superiority, a sense of insecurity, re-election strategy, political maneuverings, rent-seeking & corruption.
- Others believe that there is a dimension of ruling party-military alliance to retain political power & fulfill business & political rent-seeking interests.
- "[In] recent years the government of Zimbabwe has been talking a lot about foreign forces who want to effect regime change. As a result, this justifies high military expenditure" (Informant)
- "The military is the modern organization of the security mechanism hence the expenditure is ... justified on the need to make sure that the military is well equipped to defend national interests" (informant).

Military as a special case

- The military is accorded a the special position.
- Budget rules are not respected at all the times. E.g. requests for additional funding are not taken to parliament.
- "It will continue to consume the big chunk of the national budget unless state security is de-emphasised and human security privileged over it" (informant)
- "To curry favour with the military for political purposes because that is where essentially all power to decide leadership and governance matters (currently) resides".
- Some believe it should not be special:
- "When a nation is not at war or at any risk of facing war or when it is not in danger, arms should not be a priority on the budget" (informant).

12

Military budgetary process

- Most informants professed ignorance of the actual budgetary process in the military.
- Most informants agreed that there is no serious oversight since the normal budgetary rules & procedures are not being followed to the letter.
- *"The (military) budget is designed to serve partisan interests (informant).*
- *"There is no civility in the decision making process since everything sounds arbitrary & biased" (informant).*

13

Pressure groups influence

- The non-military related pressure groups have little influence
- *"Well, I think (non-military) pressure groups have been largely concerned with the wider political questions ... Most are general human rights groups, which deal mostly with matters of civil and political rights" (informant).*
- Multilateral donor organisations since 1999 have had no direct influence.
- The suppliers of military-related & daily essentials have considerable influence (have connections with military chiefs & the ruling party).
- *"Companies of those related to army chiefs are given preference as suppliers of military needs. ... This is a clear conflict of interest and that one cannot even imagine how that relationship affects military expenditure but that is just a single example" (informant).*
- *"Another case is the ZDI. The proceeds from the industry have not been accounted for. Its activities are not reported to Parliament" (informant).*
- The ZDF has greater influence through the JOC, the ruling party & the presidency.

14

External threats

- There is a perceived threat of regime change from the West.
- The paranoia of re-colonisation and liberation war hangover has exacerbated this belief.
- They believe the West will invade Zimbabwe as they did to other rogue states like Iraq.
- *"There is an unhealthy relationship, which probably allows the government to justify its military expenditure. That such countries as Iraq and Afghanistan have been invaded, and Zimbabwe has been placed by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, alongside its allies like Iran and North Korea as part of the 'axis of evil' probably raises their fears and therefore allows them to justify their expenditure" (informant).*

15

Beliefs & attitudes decision-makers

- Only a strong military can achieve national security under prevailing circumstances.
- *"In the aftermath of the DRC war most of the resources allocated to the army were influenced by opposition politics" (informant).*
- Colonial history generated fear & insecurity.
- *"I think every nation has its fears and insecurities and given the history (of) colonialism, people are generally vulnerable and sceptical. Perhaps this feeds into the psyche of the leadership, which, to put it mildly, appears quite paranoid & for that reason causes ... increase(d) expenditure, perhaps unnecessarily at the expense of other more deserving cases." (informant)*

Military budget oversight

- Parliament was not consulted when the MoD is given extra funds or on some important military issues.
- *"Besides supplementary budgets, the defence ministry and other security forces benefit very much from the unallocated statutory reserves held by the Ministry of Finance, which they access without parliamentary approval" (informant)*

16

5.2 Evidence from documentary sources

- The secondary information was meant to supplement and compliment the evidence from informal interactions with key informants.
- The government has different beliefs and reasons for justifying the level of milex.
- (1) to fulfill its constitutional role of providing national defence,
- (2) the dynamic, volatile & unpredictable nature of the country's security environment
- (3) external threats and regime change
- (4) training of military personnel
- (5) regional cooperation and international peace-keeping operations
- (6) re-equipment & modernisation programme
- (7) belief that defence is expensive.

17

Evidence from documentary sources

Government and military beliefs

- The Minister of Defence, Sekeramayi in 2005 said: *"... defence & security of any nation the world over are not cheap commodities". Milex is "indispensable" as they guarantee "peace, tranquillity & stability" (Anon, 2005a).*
- Mugabe on regime change: *"There is an orchestrated, much wider & carefully planned regime change plot by internal & external enemy forces with plenty of funding from some commercial farmers & British organizations ..."* (Anon, 2007a)
- The Defence ministry on training of military personnel, Sekeramayi said: *"[M]ilitary preparedness should always be top priority even during peacetime" (Anon, 2005a).*
- In 2003 the director of army training on national pride & status: *"The firepower exercise has shown that the ZDF was a formidable force capable of defending the country from its enemies. 'We are so strong that people may not understand our capabilities'" (Anon, 2003).*
- The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence on the government's re-equipment programme. The ZDF signed major contracts with Chinese companies "NORINCO, CATIC & Polytechnologies" Anon, 2006b).
- *"There has been a programme to upgrade & replenish the weaponry reserve, to keep up with advancements in the military hardware industry" Dzamara (2007).*

18

The importance of regional cooperation.

- The Minister of Defence reported, Zimbabwe's participation in many peace keeping operations. Zimbabwe has a peace-keepers' regional role: "Through the establishment of the Regional Peacekeeping and Training Centre & before that the Zimbabwe Staff College and Military Academy" (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005 p357)
- MoD's international peace-keeping benefits: "the force has used proceeds from UN peacekeeping missions to purchase vehicles from Japan, which has not imposed sanctions on Harare" (Anon, 2004a).

Defence allocations are driven by regime security agenda

- There was drastic change in Zimbabwe's defence policy after 1999. "In the 1990's, the defence policy concentrated more on regional collaborative security, with the ZNA being deployed in peace support operations, & Zimbabwe being prominent in the regional military-political security organizations. The post-2000 national crisis has resulted in national defence policy essentially being defined as the preservation of ZANU-PF party and government..." (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005 p351).

No appreciation of the trade-offs

- There is no appreciation of the trade-offs between defence & other social ministries. "As we write, last year's high defence expenditure, amongst other things left delivery of health services in an even more parlous state. ... Defence expenditure remains the highest in a yr, we are not at war..." (Rupiya, 2003 p258).

Effect of elections and ideology

- Millex is fuelled by elections. Military sources: "Our army has received the equipment as part of a deal to fully equip it ahead of the March parliamentary elections" (Anon, 2005c).
- Giles Mutsekwa (secretary of defence for MDC) said, "We believe this is a kind of [intimidation] tactic because we are going towards very crucial elections next year" (Carter 2004).
- Rupiya (2003) and Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) on Mugabe's beliefs from the 80s. "... Prime Minister and Minister of Defence on the future role of the armed forces... espoused the Chinese style of soldiers..., organized more on militia & cadre lines than the pure military professionals" (Chitiyo & Rupiya 2005 p339).
- "The ruling party has succeeded in 'buying' the loyalty of the military through selective material payments and privileges" Ndlovu-Gatshehi (2006, p75).

Militarization of state institutions

- Militarization of state institutions & the lack of accountability emanates from Zimbabwe's political and liberation history (Rupiya 2003; Ndlovu-Gatshehi 2003b). Most political institutions & govt departments are authoritarian in character and this transcends to the operation of government departments. Rupiya concluded that the "ruling party's approach to politico-socio-economic problem solving during this critical period of late 1999 to 2002 has not moved out of the revolutionary war context" (Rupiya, 2003 p257).

The army benefits from non-security budgets

- "National leaders in countries like Angola, DRC, Uganda, or Zimbabwe can divert significant resources to security forces in ways that are entirely shielded from public scrutiny & accountability. Funds that contribute directly to security forces requirements- such as construction of facilities - can be obscured in budgets of otherwise unrelated ministries." Henk & Rupiya (2001 p6).
- Maphosa only revealed one source of funds as the RBZ: "We are grateful to the RBZ governor Gideon Gono for availing US\$4 669 065, 72 towards our plan" (Nkatazo, 2006)

Millex decisions without consulting Parliament.

- The Parliamentary Committee on Defence on certain occasions called the MoD to account for un sanctioned purchases of armaments. (Anon, 2004c).
- International Crisis Group (2000, p6) report on Zimbabwe's defence forces intervention in the DRC. "(This) was done with little or no consultation with Parliament, Cabinet or his [Mugabe] party's central committee or with Zimbabwe's regional partners: ...".

20

Arms acquisition & limited oversight of procurement processes

- Parliamentary Defence Committee, "... queried the manner in which the purchase of military equipment had by-passed the State Procurement Board, a move ... might result in the army buying equipment which may be expensive, but having a short life span" (Anon, 2004g).
- "There is currently no agency responsible for monitoring conflicts of interest among public servants who make decisions on matters of state procurement ..." Makumbe (2004 p3)
- "However, even with structures that should provide some accountability, senior policymakers often have the authority to override them. It is noteworthy that Zimbabwe's Comptroller & Auditor-General repeatedly have called attention to irregularities in Zimbabwe's defence spending, with little indication of government interest in investigating wrongdoing or correcting the abuse" (Henk and Rupiya (2001, pp 19-20). Manyukwe (2007) reported that the defence forces failed to account for billions of allocated finances.

21

No consultation and debate of millex

- Rupiya (2003, p261) sees a need for consultation & debate to avoid misunderstandings & misrepresentation of actions. He says, "Costs related to the funding of the armed forces need to be widely debated in order to break the current conspiracy between the major actors that has occurred by default". Rupiya observed that as a whole the security budget has been the highest since 1980. "Expenditure & regular increases on police, militia, war veterans and armed forces has been unequalled compared to civil service & other productive sectors" Rupiya (2003, p258).

Beliefs of external threats

- The government & military seem to take the criticisms of the US and UK governments as threats of invasion. Air Vice Marshal Elson Moyo in 2006 & the ZNA Commander Lieutenant General Phillip Sibanda in 2007 showed this paranoia. Moyo "... urged the graduands to defend the country's sovereignty saying Zimbabwe was under western siege. 'We have to defend at all cost, our nation and its territorial integrity'" (Anon 2006c). General Sibanda said: "Your passing out today comes at a time when the country is facing numerous challenges, as a result of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe and the regime change agenda of the British and Americans who are being assisted by unpatriotic Zimbabweans" (Anon, 2007).

23

Arms embargo imposed by the West

- The arms embargo limited the capability of the ZDF & forced the regime to look for other sources of arms as well as other methods of financing the purchase. The government is relying on barter methods to secure the scarce ammunition, equipment & planes (Peta, 2005; Dzamara, 2007). "China has been getting the bulk of tobacco, diamonds plus gold ... in exchange for agricultural equipment & military hardware" Dzamara (2007, p1).
- Zimbabwe has benefitted from allies. "Chinese and Zimbabwean military ties are among the closest on the African continent" (Eisenman 2005, p4). The ZDF commander said the "ZDF have benefited greatly through programmes like military aid, training exchange programmes and secondment of the People's Liberation Army Instructors team (PLAIT) to the Zimbabwe's staff college" (Anon, 2006d).
- The military as a special institution.
- Ndlovu-Gatshehi (2003b, p130) highlights the position of the military: "...the security of the state must cease to be privileged over other forms of security such as human security, social security and security from arbitrary power."
- Different beliefs and attitudes towards millex.
- "Senior military personnel are strongly associated politically to Mugabe and many have lucrative business ties to ruling party stalwarts" (Leonard, 2005).
- "... Zimbabwean entrepreneurs connected to senior officials may have obtained lucrative access to Congolese minerals in exchange for Zimbabwe's backing of the Kabila regime. However, it is worth noting that neither Uganda nor Zimbabwe have been able to fully finance the human and material costs of their Congo intervention with Congolese resources" (Henk and Rupiya, 2001 p12).
- Kasambala (Human Rights Watch Zimbabwe) believes that the military defends Mugabe because they are corrupt. She believes that the JOC members, "A lot of them have dirty hands. They've enriched themselves and want to hang on to what they have and avoid charges of corruption" (Lindow 2008, p3).
- "Zanu (PF) is currently holding on to deals it cut during the previous campaign such as the \$16 billion logging operation,..." (Anon, 2007a).

24

Military industry influence

- The ZDF commander has been accused of conflict of interest as a company owned by his wife ZimSafe had some contracts to supply ZDF with protective clothing. The permanent secretary for Defence, Maphosa confirmed: *"At the moment ZimSafe does not have any contract with the MoD. But in the past it has won contracts, through open tender, to supply reflective materials"* (Anon, 2006e). The tendering process has led to higher than normal prices, as the suppliers are normally intermediary. Maphosa said: *"...middleman ended up profiteering at the expense of taxpayers. There is a political element in these so-called 'middlemen' and indigenous companies."* (Anon, 2006e).
- Nkiwane (1999 p5) argues that Zimbabwe does not have an "arms industry", per se but rather produces small ammunition, as well as mortar supplies through ZDI. ZDI produces and export some of the ammunition. *"All sales by ZDI must receive the approval of the Zimbabwe Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs."* Mlambo (nd, p18) argues that the operations of ZDI are not transparent. *"The culture of secrecy & silence which is characteristic of the present ZDI operations is out of step with current international trends & democratic practice."*
- Civic groups & the media have tried to expose any unnecessary expenditures by the military. *"Some African countries, among them Nigeria, Uganda, & Zimbabwe have an independent press that has endeavoured to call attention to defence spending"* (Henk and Rupiya, 2001 p19). The opposition believes the military makes most decisions. Nelson Chamisa, the MDC spokesperson: *"If you look at key institutions, the army is calling the shots. Even Mugabe's campaign is being carried out by the army."* (Lindou 2008, p2)

25

Confidentiality and secrecy

- The Zimbabwe National Army's public relations directorate when asked for information about the shipment of arms from China in 2005, refused to comment but only said such "information was confidential". The Defence Minister Dr. Sekeramayi also refused to comment on the same issue saying: *"I'm sorry I do not discuss military issues with the media and over the phone..."* (Anon, 2005d).
- **The military budgetary process**
 - Formally, the budgetary process in the military is the same as in the other government ministries and departments. Documents reviewed from the Ministry of Finance and Parliament acknowledges that ministries, parliament and the public have an important role in the budgetary process. Murewa (2006, p5) said, *"I wish to start my Budget speech by acknowledging the valuable support and cooperation that I continue to receive from Parliament in the formulation and implementation of the National Budget."*
 - Parliament gets involved in the budgetary process at the formulation stage through participation in pre-budget seminars. *"... Pre - budget seminar series ...allows parliamentarians to share views with Government, business, labour & ultimately contribute to the budgetary process in fulfilment of their representational role"* (Mnangagwa, 2004). The main aim of the pre-budget seminars is to come up with: *"... realistic and practical recommendations for improving our budgetary process & strengthening the oversight function of Parliament"* (Mnangagwa, 2004). Mnangagwa said the national budget in Zimbabwe is guided by nationalist priorities as well as patriotism.
 - Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) explained the official role of Parliament in military budgeting and management in Zimbabwe. *"Parliament provides an important military management mechanism. ...the ZDF is subject to the security and administration of regulatory parliamentary and security committees. These include Budget, Public Accounts and Security committees, which censor the defence budget, scrutinize defence expenditure and monitor the activities of the defence forces, respectively"* (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005 p35).
 - Since 2004, the defence ministry has benefited from the RBZ quasi-fiscal policies. The Finance Minister acknowledged in the 2007 national budget statement that quasi-fiscal funds did not get the Parliament's approval (Murewa, 2006 pp28, 40).
 - In the case of citizens' access to the national budgetary process, the research by the Global Integrity revealed that: *"There is little to nothing of significance that the citizens can do even if they are totally against the priorities and allocations of a particular year's budget. The sentiments of citizens are generally not respected, feared or listened to in Zimbabwe. So though the citizens murmured disapproval at the largest budget allocation going to defence in a time of peace, nothing was done about it"* (Global Integrity, 2004)

Power retention agenda

- Biti (2007a) wrote: *"the supplementary budget betrays the contradiction in ZANU PF state between on one hand the need to be loyal to basic economic fundamentals and on the other, the power retention agenda in which the State resources will be spend without reason or limit purely for the purposes of maintaining and reproducing power. One finds that the amounts allocated to the President's Office, the MoD & the Ministry of Home Affairs ... is 33% of the supplementary budget. If one adds the traditional slush fund, the unallocated reserve vote of \$2.4 trillion, then the amount being allocated to securocrats ... is 43 % of the supplementary budget"*
- Biti (2007b) wrote: *"... It is a State that is fiercely loyal to one value and one value alone: the power retention matrix. No wonder in real terms, 70 percent of the budget is devoted to the army..."*
- Biti (2007a) also highlights the failure by to present the sources of finance for the supplementary budget: *"..."*
- Most military specialists & political analysts agree with Biti's sentiments & analysis, that security forces are there to defend the regime in power rather than the country (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005; Rupiya, 2008; and Ndlovu-Gatssheni, 2003a, 2003b & 2006).
- Chitiyo & Rupiya (2005 p359) observed ZANU PF's adopted a 'Total Strategy' that the South African apartheid state employed as a socio-political grand plan.
- Despite being defeated in the 2008 general election, the ruling party did not concede defeat but instead embarked on a strategy of suppression & brutality. Rupiya (2008, p1) argues: *"In the newfound relationship, the distance between party and government was collapsed and by extension, the professional standing of the military in its national symbolism disappeared. Instead, the security organs have assumed partisan roles and functions in support of the ruling party around the electoral result."*
- Ndlovu-Gatssheni (2003a pp30-31): *"... see themselves as hired to protect the regime in power rather than the population of Zimbabwe"*.
- *"To keep the army on his side, President Mugabe has awarded soldiers substantial salary and allowance increases"* (Anon, 2005c).

27

Scare tactics

- Young (1997 p137) brings out the use of scare tactics as a determinant of millex in Zimbabwe. He quotes the then State minister of defence Ernest Kadungure who said, *"There would be mutiny by soldiers and chaos throughout the country and, what we fear most, although we could suppress the mutiny, our route to the sea and all our trade would come to a standstill'. The allocations were subsequently approved in a record time of 15 minutes."*

28

6. What drives millex and what are the security implications?

External threats and regime change

- The country is not under any external threats. Zimbabwe is not at war-high allocations to the military are not in any way really justified.
- The ruling elite is concerned with regime security than regime change. The bulk of the findings show that millex has nothing or little to do with external enemies. With political instability in the country, high millex was used to crack down on opposition forces. The imported armaments have been used to influence elections (e.g the June 2008 presidential plebiscite).
- The regime change argument is not convincing because: (1) international law protects sovereignty and the non-interference (though the US and its allies have violated this in some cases) (2) the Zimbabwean government enjoys regional patronage (3) for the past decade, the government allegation of regime change has not materialised (4) the defeat of Saddam shows that no amount of millex can stop the superpowers.
- The major reasons are
 - 1) the obvious need to strengthen and protect national security - What may be contested however is the extent to which resources are deployed to military purpose.
 - 2) national resources used to finance private investment in the DRC, to the extent that millex was increased to fund that war.
- Millex levels thus depend on rent-seeking activities of army chiefs and ZANU PF. The involvement of the ZDI in the DRC mission also brings in, the military industrial complex factor.

6.2 Security perception of government decision makers

- The belief that defence is an expensive commodity has often been used to justify unreasonable bids. Zimbabwe's security perception is anchored on belief that national security depends on the level of millex or the ability to defend its territory.

6.3 National pride or status

- The driving force behind millex in Zimbabwe is not national pride/status per se but regime security. The issue of national pride is secondary issue, which is not a major driver of millex. The issue of national sovereignty and pride are used as a means to justify allocation of more resources for power retention purposes.

30

■ 6.4 Public choices and milex decisions

■ Contrary to McNutt (1996 p140)'s assertion that governments are there to be manipulated, in Zimbabwe it seems the regime had a fair share of manipulating interest groups to its advantage. The median voter model as a decision-making tool does not really apply in Zimbabwe. In principle, the values of democracy have been scuttled or are not applied normally. The bureaucratic model applies to a lesser extent as the bureaucrats try to influence the overall ministry budget to maximize their utility.

■ 6.5 Rent-seeking and power retention

■ Millex is used as payment to the military to retain political power. The civilian leaders in government, in their self-interest manipulate the defence budget decision making process.

■ The two major interest groups (the military & ZANU-PF) are colluding. There is cross-representation of the ruling party and the military both in each of the structures.

31

■ 6.6 Self-interest and interest groups

■ The violent nature of the military influence the behaviour of decision makers in government departments. The decision-makers find it difficult to resist the demands from the military-related interest group. Resource allocation thus is not objective because it is not transparent and there is coercion and no accountability. The issue of self-interest seems to be much stronger. It is common knowledge that companies associated with high-ranking officials in the military and the ruling party are involved in business with the security forces.

■ It is difficult to separate bureaucratic and military influence in resource allocation. Given the nature of the military (dictatorial), it means that there is greater military influence on the budgets. This could explain the pole position of millex.

■ 6.7 Should the military be a special case?

■ In Zimbabwe the military is a special institution. As a partner in the political power struggles the military automatically occupies a unique position.

32

Conclusion

- Underlying determinants:
- Regime security- power retention agenda
- Regime change paranoia – external threats
- Belief that defence is expensive
- Military is special
- Military and political group interests – elite corruption
- Liberation war traditions
- Poor defence budgets oversight.

33